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A Hybrid Human and Organisational Analysis Method for Railway Accidents based on 
STAMP-HFACS and Human Information Processing 
 
 
Abstract 
Safety is a constant priority for the railway industry and there are numerous hazards in and around the 
rail system which may result in damage to train and environment, human injury and fatalities. Low 
levels of human and organisational performance have been shown to be a prime cause of railway 
accidents and a number of accident models and methods have been developed in order to probe deeper 
into the role played by organisational factors in accident causation. The Systems–Theoretical Accident 
Modelling and Processes (STAMP) method for example, represents a promising systematic and 
systemic way of examining sociotechnical systems such as the railway. Another method, the Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), based upon Reason’s model of human error in 
an organisational context, has also proved popular as a human factors accident analysis framework. 
However, human factors elements are still somewhat limited and under-specified and these managerial 
and social issues within an organisation are simply regarded as sources of failure in the control 
constraints of STAMP. HFACS likewise, categorises accident data rather than analysing it in more 
depth. In this context, a hybrid human and organisational analysis method based on HFACS-STAMP 
(HFACS-STAMP method for railway accidents, HS-RAs) is proposed to identify and analyse human 
and organisational factors involved in railway accidents. Using the categories of human errors derived 
from HFACS and the structured systematic analysis process of STAMP, the HS-RAs method provides 
a mechanism by which active failures can promulgate across organisations and give a systemic analysis 
of human error in accidents. Combined with human information processing, the HS-RAs method gives 
a detailed causal analysis of human errors from receiving information to implement control actions. 
At last, the HS-RAs method is demonstrated using a case study of the 2011 Yong-Wen railway 
collision. A number of prominent accident causes of human factors are revealed and necessary 
countermeasures are proposed to avoid the recurrence of similar accidents. The HFACS-STAMP 
hybrid method has several advantages and can contribute to railway safety by providing a detailed 
analysis of the role of human error in railway accidents. 
 
Keywords: Human and organisational factors, STAMP, HFACS, human information processing, 
accident analysis, Yong-Wen railway accident 
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1. Introduction 
At the end of 2015, the amount of track covered by the railway industry in China had reached 
121,000km including 19.000km high-speed railway lines. In terms of passenger numbers China ranks 
in the first place in the world with over 1.1 billion trips made on high-speed bullet trains alone. The 
complex control system and serious operational demands circumstance of the Chinese railway system 
represent a typical socio-technical (Wilson et al., 2007) and safety-critical system (Li et al., 2013), in 
which any technical and human errors can lead to human death, injury and financial loss. A number of 
prominent railway accidents have happened recently. A high-speed railway derailment occurred in 
Germany on 3rd June, 1998 for example, resulting in 101 fatalities (Esslinger et al., 2004). In Chinas 
a high-speed railway crash at Wenzhou in July, 2011 caused 40 fatalities and 172 injuries (SAWS, 
2011). More recently, the Santiago de Compostela derailment in Spain in July, 2013 resulted in 78 
fatalities and 145 injuries (Shultz et al., 2016). Human error has long been recognised as the 
predominant factor in aviation mishaps (Reason, 1997). Estimates of the proportion of mishaps due to 
human error generally range between 60% and 80% (O’Hare et al., 1994). It is widely believed that 
human factors make a major contribution to most accidents across a range industries including railway, 
aviation, maritime and mining. Human error is generally thought as the result of a range of factors 
involving people tools, tasks, and operating environment (Wilson et al., 2007). Progress on safety 
comes from understanding the connections between these factors.  
A number of human factors methods have been developed in order to identify the human and 
organisation factors involved in accidents. One of the most widely used systemic accident causation 
models (Dokas, et al., 2013; Chatzimichailidou and Dokas, 2016) is the Systems–Theoretical Accident 
Modelling and Processes (STAMP) method. STAMP is based on system and control theory and 
focuses on safety as a control problem and an emergent feature of the system (Leveson, 2004). STAMP 
regards human errors as the symptoms of the system rather than causal factors of accidents requiring 
analysts to consider how system conditions may lead to “errors”. STAMP provides a holistic view of 
human errors and organisational factors in its analysis, the human factor element of STAMP is 
somewhat limited and under-specified and managerial and social issues in a socio-technical system are 
simply viewed as sources of failure in terms of control constraints (Harris and Li, 2011). In addition, 
STAMP does not provide extensive guidance for understanding why humans behave the way they do 
(e.g., constraints covering human information processing - France, 2017) and as a result analysts have 
found it difficult to identify human and organisational failures (Dong, 2012; Suo, 2012; Song, 2012; 
Niu et al., 2014). 
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The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is another widely used human 
factors accident analysis framework. HFACS is a generic human error-coding framework based on 
Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1990) and developed by Shappell and Wiegmann (2000). 
HFACS analyses human error at four levels: Unsafe acts, Preconditions for unsafe acts, Unsafe 
supervision and Organisational influences. One problem, however, is that HFACS is sometimes seen 
as over-specifying the factors in the levels and analysts can miss out important factors simply because 
they were not covered by the method HFACS (e.g. interactions between groups and organisational 
decisions are often not included in the analysis -  Stringfellow, 2010).  One potential improvement 
might be that the HFACS classification system would be more comprehensive if it were applied to the 
control action analysis in the STAMP safety control structure. In the current paper, a hybrid human 
and organisational analysis method based on HFACS-STAMP for Railway accidents (HS-RAs) is 
proposed in order to improve the identification and classification of human and organisational factors 
involved in railway accidents. Combined with the general process of human information processing 
(HIP) made up of Detection, Identification, Decision and Action (Nagel, 1988), the HS-RAs method 
can give a detailed analysis of human errors (construct causal scenarios) and thereby probe deeper into 
the relationship between causal factors and human error. The proposed hybrid method is illustrated 
using a case study, namely the Yong-Wen railway collision which occurred on 23 July, 2011. The 
prominent accident causes of human factors are revealed, and necessary preventive measures are 
proposed to avoid the recurrence of similar accidents. As a result, we argue that the HFACS-STAMP 
approach can contribute railway safety by giving a detailed analysis of human errors in railway 
accidents. 
 
2. Accident analysis, cybernetics and human error 
2.1 Systems–Theoretical Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) 
The STAMP method is based on systems and control theory and also draws on a rich tradition of work 
in cybernetics (Wiener, 1948) covering the interaction between humans and their environments. 
STAMP focuses on safety as a control problem and emergent system properties (e.g. safety) are 
controlled by imposing constraints on the behaviour and interaction of system components (Leveson, 
2012). Similar to other earlier cybernetic models (e.g.. Beer’s (1984) Viable Systems Model), STAMP 
views systems as interrelated hierarchical levels of controls and constraints with each level in the 
hierarchy imposing constraints on the level below. Three basic constructs are used by STAMP to 
determine why control was ineffective and resulted in an accident: safety constraints, hierarchical 
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safety control structures, and process models. Safety constraints can be barriers or activities which 
require some action to provide protection (i.e. detection, measurement, diagnosis or response to a 
hazard). Accidents occur when system safety constraints are inadequate or not enforced (Leveson, 
2004). Hierarchical safety control structures are used by STAMP to describe the composition of 
systems. Each hierarchical level of a system imposes constraints on, and controls the behaviour of, the 
level beneath it. Control (two-way communication) processes operate between system levels to enforce 
the safety constraints. Process models are incorporated into STAMP as any human or automated 
controller requires a model of the process they are responsible for controlling if they are to be effective 
(Leveson, 2012). STAMP regards human error as the symptom of the system rather than of specific 
individuals and a key intention is to avoid the promotion of a blame culture. Mental models (the process 
model for human controller) have been introduced in the STAMP analysis in order to cover human 
control structures in the system (Leveson 2012; Ouyang et al., 2010). The analysis depicts flaws across 
the entire safety control structure of the system, as well as the interaction between those structures and 
their control failures that resulted in the accident. STPA (Systems Theoretic Process Analysis) is a 
hazard analysis method, and CAST (Causal analysis using STAMP) is an accident analysis method 
based on STAMP. STAMP has been used previously to analyse rail accidents and incidents (e.g. 
Ouyang et al., 2010; Song et al., 2012; Suo, 2012; Dong, 2012; Underwood, Waterson, 2014; Niu et 
al., 2014; Liu et al., 2016; Wang, 2016). Stringfellow (2010) and France (2017) have additionally 
added into STAMP a human error taxonomy and organisational error taxonomy to support analysis. 
However, the STAMP taxonomy of control failure is generic in nature (not restricted to a particular 
domain) and is thus less restrictive than that provided by HFACS (Salmon et al., 2012). STAMP 
applies control theory even to the analysis of human and organisational factors, so there is potential to 
adopt a human information processing framework or task-based framework in order to 
categorise/analyse human and organisational factors (Stringfellow, 2010).  
 
2.2 Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
Based on the popular accident causation model, the Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 1990), HFACS was 
developed in order to provide a theory-driven structure to analyse and classify operator errors in naval 
aviation accidents and mishaps (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000).  The Swiss Cheese Model describes 
active failures (which are the errors proximal to the accident, associated with the performance of front-
line operators in complex systems) and latent failures (distal errors and system misspecifications, 
which lie dormant within the system for a long time). Those failures act like the “holes” in the different 
cheese slices and can result in a hazard triggering an accident causing harm to people, assets and the 
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environment when the “holes” in a system’s defences alignment. There are four classification levels 
in HFACS for Unsafe Acts (Level 1), Preconditions for Unsafe Acts (Level 2), Unsafe Supervision 
(Level 3) and Organisational Influences (Level 4). Unsafe acts of front-line operators which led 
directly to the accident are viewed as arising through human error. Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
represent the environmental conditions under which the unsafe acts took place, (e.g, poor team working, 
and the operators’ physiological state). Unsafe supervision is one of the most important defences for 
unsafe acts and their preconditions. Poor decision-making by management, for example, can directly 
affect supervisory practices, as well as the conditions and actions of operators. HFACS has been used 
to be used in the past to carry out railway accident analysis (Zhan et al., 2017; Madigan et al., 2016; 
Kim et al., 2008; Oh et al., 2006; Reinach and Vale, 2006).  
 
2.3 Human information processing 
The field of human factors examines the relationships between humans and technology. It is concerned 
with interactions, both physical and cognitive, between the human and their tasks, as well as the quality 
of performance of those tasks. Thus, it offers a way to understand why human errors happen in their 
dynamic task processing. Nagel (1988) has suggested that it is possible to cover most of the possible 
causes of human error in the cockpit with a three-stage information processing models of human 
performance, which are Information, Decision and Action. A commonly used model of human 
information processing is that described by Wickens and Flach (1988).  Wickens and Flach (1988) 
summarise the process in which environmental input from the sensory system passes through 
successive stages of perception, working memory and decision-making. Long-term memory and short-
term memory create a mental representation of the current state of the world, like the controller mental 
model for the controlled process state.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Framework for the proposed methodology 
Instead of using a single method in isolation, this study proposed a hybrid accident analysis 
methodology by integrating HFACS-STAMP with human information processing for railway 
accidents (the ‘HS-RAs’ method). There are different ways with which to integrate STAMP and 
HFACS methods. For example, Harris and Li (2011) developed HFACS-STAMP – an extension of 
the HFACS methodology – that can accommodate errors promulgating across organisational 
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boundaries reflecting the open system nature of modern airline operations. Lower et al. (2015) 
developed a hybrid model based on STAMP-HFACS and fuzzy sets in order to facilitate risk analysis 
of serious air traffic incident which focuses on identifying adverse relationships between the 
components by connecting the elements in the HFACS categorisation system with the STAMP control 
structure. In this present study, HS-RAs has been developed incorporating HFACS levels for errors 
categories into the STAMP safety control structure for analysis based on human information 
processing. The proposed conceptual model framework is presented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The framework consists of three parts: (1) safety control structure and analysis steps are captured using 
STAMP; (2) HFACS is used to assist in identifying human and organisational errors which contributed 
to system accident; and, (3) the four stages of human information processing as described by Wickens 
and Flach (1988).  
 
3.1.1 The extension - HFACS categories 
Zhan et al. (2017) put forward a framework based on HFACS (HFACS-RAs) and accident/incident 
data in order to identify and classify human and organisation factors involved in accidents which 
occurred between 2009 and 2012 in China. In the HFACS-RAs framework, the accident causal factors 
are divided into four main categories and 21 relevant sub-categories with the definition and detailed 
description for each category of the HFACS-RAs framework. However, one drawback is that the 
definition and detailed description of each category are more about the operation process, as compared 
to the development process (e.g., purchasing of unsuitable and unqualified equipment such as train 
control equipment). Analysis of railway accidents requires a systematic analysis perspective which 
takes into account the various components of the system and their surrounding environment, including 
development and operation process. An extension of the definition and detailed description for HFACS 
categories is needed in order to cover the full range of human and organisational errors involved in 
both developmental and operational processes (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 about here 
3.1.2 Human information processing model for the STAMP model in accident analysis 
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A number of researchers have made modifications to STAMP, STPA and CAST (Thomas, 2013; 
Stringfellow, 2010; France, 2017). Thornberry (2014) for example, extended the human controller 
model based on human information processing and France (2017) extended the human controller 
mental model. According to Wickens and Flach (1988), human information processing models consists 
of information detection, information identification, decision making and action generation, and the 
process can be influenced by human factors, such as attention, fatigue (figure 2). Unsafe control actions 
refer to the factors inside of the human controller, such as the mental model flaws, and stimuli from 
outside, such as control actions from up-level controllers. The human controller receives the control 
command from up-level controllers. Feedback information of the controlled process from senses 
detects useful information based on the knowledge stored in the mental models. The next step involves 
identifying the information and classifying it into different parts, such as controlled processed, 
operational environment or other controllers.  The identified information and mental models are then 
updated into new states.  The human controller makes decisions and generates control actions based 
on updated mental models. Errors may occur in any part of the information process. Tracing back from 
the unsafe control action to the input information provides one way of tracing the factors contributing 
to unsafe control actions.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Safety can be regarded as a system level propriety and as a result, accident and incident analysis should 
address system components from physical to organisational levels of analysis, as well as 
communication and coordination between components. Accordingly, France (2017) listed five 
contextual factor categories for the analysis shown in order to assist the analysis of an individual error 
or factor (table 2).  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
3.1.3 Integrating STAMP and HFACS 
Aside from supporting the analysis at the level of human information processing there is also a need 
to support the analysis of errors at the organisational level. Stringfellow (2010), Thornberry (2014) 
and Lower (2018) have all incorporated individual and organisational error categories into STAMP. 
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Stringfellow (2010), examined the unsafe control actions at the individual controller and included six 
error categories with 23 subcategories. Lower et al (2018) added another category with five 
subcategories for the individual precondition from HFACS level 1 and level 2. Individual conditions 
describe the state of a human controller in terms of physiological and mental state, in this case five 
categories of level 2 of the HFACS structure (Zhan et al., 2017). These involve the following 
classifications: 
1. Inadequate control goal [Entire]; 
2. The control algorithm does not enforce constraints[Part]; 
3. Model of the controlled process is inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect[Part]; 
4. Model of the organisational structure (other controllers in the control hierarchy) is 
inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect[Entire]; 
5. Inadequate coordination between decision makers[Part]; 
6. Inadequate execution of the control loop[Part]; 
7. Inadequate individual conditions[Entire]; 
7.1 Adverse Physiological States 
7.2 Adverse Mental states 
7.3 Personal readiness 
7.4 Substandard condition of team 
7.5 Adverse conditions of Mission 
 
For the analysis structure in figure 2, CATE 6 is about the control action execution, information input 
from up-level controller(s) and information feedback; CATE 5 is about communication information 
input; CATE 2 is about the control algorithm which is the way the controller make decision and select 
control action; CATE 3 and 4 are about the mental model of controller providing information for 
decision making and action generation. Individual errors will be divided into two categories – influence 
entire information processing [Entire] and influence part of information processing [Part], which have 
been marked in the seven categories. Those classifications are used in the analysis process. According 
to the organisational error taxonomy (Stringfellow, 2010), unsafe control actions at the organisational 
level occur due to seven categories with 12 subcategories. The first four categories are about the 
structure of the organisation, while the last three categories relate to organisational management. 
Lower et al. (2018) states that ‘inadequate safety management and learning processes’ can be 
influenced by the organisational factors and supervisory factors. However, the operational standards 
(table 2) are included in the organisational influences in HFACS level 4 and can contribute to the 
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assignment of goals, responsibility to controllers. ‘Inadequate safety management and learning 
processes’ involve dynamic system organisation and operation and is influenced by unsafe supervision. 
We therefore combine the HFACS factors into organisational errors as follows: 
1. Inadequate assignment of goals, control authority and responsibilities to controllers; 
1.1 Inadequate coordination among controllers and decision makers 
1.1.1 Overlaps of responsibility 
a) Inadequate organisational process 
1.1.2 Gaps in responsibility 
a) Inadequate organisational process 
1.2 Role is not suitable for human control 
1.2.1 Inadequate safety culture 
1.2.2 Inadequate safety program 
1.3 Inadequate organisational change process for the reassignment of roles and 
goals 
1.3.1 Inadequate supervision 
2. Inadequate allocation of resources to controllers throughout the organisation; 
2.1 Inadequate resources 
3. Inadequate assignment of controller hierarchy; 
3.1 Hierarchy surrounding organisational processes do not support safe control 
3.1.1 Inadequate organisational process 
4. Inadequate communication channels provided in the organisation; 
4.1 Communication channels do not exist 
4.1.1 Inadequate organisational process 
4.2 Communication channels do not have sufficient bandwidth 
4.2.1 Inadequate organisational process 
4.2.2 Inadequate equipment resources 
4.3 Communication channels are not created or eliminated in response to changing 
circumstances 
4.3.1 Inadequate supervision 
4.3.2 Failed to correct problems 
5. Inadequate communication of system-level goals and constraints; 
5.1 Inadequate safety culture 
5.2 Inadequate safety program 
6. Inadequate safety management and learning processes; 
6.1 Inadequate supervision 
6.1.1 Inadequate organisational process 
6.1.2 Inadequate resources 
6.2 Planned inappropriate operations 
6.2.1 Inadequate safety program 
6.3 Supervisory violations 
7. Inadequate interactions with external bodies. 
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3.2 The ‘HS-RAs’ method   
Figure 3 shows an overall flow diagram of hybrid accident analysis method. The analysis process 
consists of five phases. The first phase focuses on the system(s) and hazard(s) identification and system 
safety control structure documentation based on STAMP. The second phase concerns human and 
organisational error identification according to the extended HFACS categories in section 3.1.1. 
Examination of each component of the safety control structure that contains a human factor helps to 
identify human or organisational unsafe control actions. The focus of Phase 3 is on human error 
analysis based on STAMP and human information processing. Analysis of human unsafe control 
actions is based on the information processing model, the individual error taxonomy (section 3.1.2) 
and five contextual factors categories. The fourth phase represents an analysis of organisational factors 
based on STAMP. The final phase (phase 5) fifth phase supports the generation of recommendations, 
that is, filtering through each of the contributing factors (including causal factor and contextual factors) 
and identifying those which could potentially be changed, controlled or compensated for so that human 
and organisational errors could not occur again. In the next section of the paper we present a worked 
example of the hybrid method using the Yong-Wen accident. 
 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
4. Case study 
4.1 Yong-Wen railway accident 
On July 23rd, 2011 at 20:30:05, an accident occured on the Yong-Wen High-speed railway in the 
precinct of Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, China which resulted in 40 fatalities. A China Railway High-
speed (CRH) train D301 crashed into another CRH train D3115 at a speed of 99 kilometres per hour. 
Six cars derailed and two of them went off a bridge 50 feet above the ground. The accident is 
considered to be the most serious railway accident in the development of Chinese railway history. The 
area where the accident occurred experienced severe lightning from 19:27 to 19:34 on July 23rd. The 
severe lightning which caused a fault in the control system. Both D3115 and D301 were behind 
schedule and reached Yongjia railway station at 19:51 and 20:12, respectively. D3115 was ordered to 
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leave Yongjia station and was notified to change its operational mode from FS mode to OS mode1F2 
because of a red-light displayed in the Train Control Centre (TCC) which indicated to the train 
controller that either a train was occupying that track circuit or that the track circuit had failed. Due to 
the lightning strikes, D3115 stopped automatically and failed to restart until nearly eight minutes later. 
During the re-start period, D3115 called the dispatcher six times and was called by the station operator 
three times, but all calls failed to connect. However, in this period, D301 was ordered to leave from 
Yongjia station as normal. Because of the failure of track circuits, D301 neither received the 
occupation information about D3115 nor stopped automatically and then two trains collided.  
 
The Chinese Train Control System (CTCS) system is developed as a new train operation system which 
suits the national conditions after studying the European Train Control System (ETCS).  It consists of 
five levels (CTCS-0 – CTCS-4) for the system that determine the basic functional requirements for 
each level. The signalling and train control system used on the accident line is the CTCS-2. The CTCS-
2 system is composed of onboard control system (including the automatic train protective (ATP) 
system), wayside equipment (including track circuits, transponders and signals) and station control 
equipment (including the Train Control Centre and Station Interlocking computer).  
  
4.2 Accident analysis using HS-RAs  
4.2.1 Identify system(s) and system hazard(s), document the system safety control structure 
Figure 4 shows the system control structure for the Yong-Wen line project development and operations. 
The operation process is also a complex process. Figure 5 shows the detail of the operation process in 
the system control structure.  
 
Figures 4 and 5 about here 
 
Based on the accident investigation report (SAWS, 2011), governmental documents (MOR Science & 
Technology Bureau and Transport Bureau, 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007d; 2007e; 2009) and interview 
                                            
2 Full supervisor (FS) mode and the On sight (OS) mode are the operation modes of Chinese Train Control system. The 
CTCS on-board equipment shall be in the Full Supervision (FS) mode when all train and track data is available on board, 
The On Sight mode enables the train to enter into a track section that could be already occupied by another train, or 
obstructed by any kind of obstacle. 
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data with railway experts in China, the relevant system and system hazard in the development phase 
and the operational phase were identified. In this case the main hazard was the collision between the 
two trains. The China Railway Signalling and Communication Co. Lt (CRSC) is the integrator of the 
CTCS-2 system on this line. The TCC (Type: LKD2-T1) involved in this accident is located at 
Wenzhou south station and is designed by Beijing National Railway Research & Design Institute of 
Signal and Communication (CRSCD), belonging to the CRSC group. TCC equipment in Wenzhou 
south station is manufactured by Shanghai Railway Communication Company (SRCC), which also 
belongs to the CRSC group. Centralized Traffic Control is located in Shanghai Railway Bureau, which 
belonged to the Ministry of Railway (MOR), and was one of the 18 railway bureaus in China. Table 3 
shows the system components in the high-speed railway including development and operations and 
system hazard in the accident.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The safety responsibilities and relevant control actions and feedback loops about the components 
related to this accident in the safety control structure are follows: 
1. TCC is the controller of the train movement authority (MA) by getting track occupation 
information through the PIO board, coding the track signals to control the signal in the interval 
in order to ensure the safety of train operation. The safety integrity level of TCC is SIL4; 
2. The onboard system of CTCS-2 is the controller for train control. The system gets track signals 
as the MA to control the train in specific operation mode, such as OS mode; onboard system 
cooperates with the train driver to ensure the train safety; 
3. The CTC (Centralised Train Control) system is the operational control system that supports the 
assistant dispatcher to control trains within a certain area on the tracks; CTC has two kinds of 
operation mode – centralisation control mode and Station Control mode for the Abnormal 
Situation (SCMoAB); the centralisation control mode is the normal mode that dispatcher 
delivers  dispatch commands through CTC to the station terminals to control the station 
components automatically, and deliver the dispatch commands to train drivers directly; 
SCMoAB mode is an abnormal control mode. When something is wrong about the CTC system, 
the dispatch delivers dispatch commands to station operators, and station operators control 
station components and the train operation in the SCMoAB control area;  
14 
 
4. The train driver should control the train through the onboard system, or directly based on the 
operational situation and dispatch commands from dispatcher or station operator; 
5. The station operator should supervise the state of the station components and the operation 
state of trains in his control area and convey abnormal situation information to dispatcher and 
relevant train drivers. A key responsibility for the station operator is to control overall the 
station components and maintain levels of safety; 
6. The dispatcher gives the appropriate dispatch commands to station components or operators 
and train drivers to ensure the all the trains operating in safe condition; 
7. Shanghai Railway Bureau is the operation management and system development supervision 
unit to enforce safety management, e.g. staff training, supervision of the safety standard 
implement, and enforce supervision of the safety design of the new system to suit the system 
operation conditions; 
8. Chinese Ministry of Railways publishes railway system regulations, standards and 
specifications and make the safety functions requirement for new equipment development and 
supervise the implement; 
9. Beijing National Railway Research & Design Institute of Signal & Company Ltd. (CRSCD)  
is the designer of the TCC system in this accident and is responsible for a safe control system 
based on relevant standards, regulations and specifications;  
10. China Railway Signal & Communication Corporation (CRSC) represents an upper-level 
management unit charged with enforcing safety management in CRSCD. 
 
4.2.2 Identify human and organisational unsafe control actions 
Examination of each component of the safety control structure (figure 4) was conducted in order to 
identify components that contain a human or organisational factor in the system. Table 4 summarises 
the components of human or organisational factors in both development and operation phases (the 
letter [D] means that a component may influence the system safety condition in the system 
development phase; [O] represents that a component may influence the system safety condition in 
system operation phase; [D, O] indicates that the influence may happen in both phases). 
 
Table 4 about here 
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An accident can be thought of as nonlinear system state combining many factors from many parts of 
the system. One factor may not result in the accident happening, but can raise the probability of the 
accident. In terms of human and organisational factors, unsafe control actions are actions that are taken 
or not taken, or not taken in proper time or order and raise the probability of the accident happening. 
Human unsafe control actions can be identified in HFACS level 1 and organisational unsafe control 
action in HFACS level 3 and 4. For each component in Table 4, human and organisational unsafe 
control actions have been identified in the third column of table 5.  The process (section 4.2.3 and 
4.2.4) is an iterative process to analyse each human or organisational unsafe control action. In the 
following analysis, we take one unsafe control action of dispatcher and one relevant organisational 
action to show the analysis process. The final analysis is shown in Table 5 for all the human controllers 
and organisations. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
4.2.3 Analyse human unsafe control action  
The unsafe control action of dispatcher A4: Dispatcher dispatched D301 into the interval without 
informing the red-light strip information will be used to show the analysis process. In the five 
contextual factors, the fourth and fifth classifications are about contributing factors for organisational 
factors:  
 
Unsafe control action:  
A4: Dispatcher dispatched D301 into the interval without informing the red-light strip information 
Identify the contributing factors in individual error taxonomy: 
1. Action Generation:  
IEs-1: Dispatcher’s control algorithm of train D301 did not match the scope of his control area: 
in the SCMoAB control, dispatcher could give the movement authority for train D301 to 
Wenzhou south station where the station operator controlled, but just received the equipment 
state from the station operator. This overlap of control responsibility led the dispatcher to issue 
this unsafe control command.  
2. Decision: 
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IEs-2: Dispatcher’s inadequate mental model of the track circuits’ status resulted in him thinking 
the interval track circuit condition met the train tracing function requirement. The wrong 
judgement about the track circuits’ status led him to make the decision to send D301 into the 
interval. 
3. Identification: 
IEs-3: Dispatcher thought he had received enough information to recognise the interval track 
circuits’ condition according to his inadequate mental model of the interval track circuits: before 
train D301 was dispatched, the dispatcher thought the interval situation compliedwith the 
automatic blocking the automatic blocking function for train tracing based on the mode of the 
interval track circuits did not change and the signals in Yongjia station were normal based on 
confirming the equipment condition in Yongjia station on CTC and inquiring as to the interval 
track circuit condition through train D3212 driving from Wenzhou south station to Yongjia 
station.  
4. Detection: 
IEs-4: The dispatcher’s inadequate mental model about the interval system led him to confirm 
the equipment status in Yongjia station and Wenzhou south station, the track circuit signal near 
Yongjia station and the operation status of D3212.   
The contributing factors in the contextual factors analysis: 
1. Physical system and technology factors 
PTFs-1: TCC and track circuits’ failures updated the track circuits’ signals breaking the train 
tracing condition for safety; 
PFTs-2: Physical system did not provide proper failure alarm and information; 
PTFs-3: Inadequate operation rules for the emergency condition; 
2. Individual and team factors 
ITFs-1: Inadequate communication between the station operator and the train D3115 driver; 
ITFs-2: Maintenance workers did not communicate in order to stop using the failed track 
circuit; 
ITFs-3: Lack of experience about the failure condition; 
ITFs-4: High workload and fatigue - the dispatcher worked a 12 hour shift and had to closely 
monitor a display for much of that time; during the 7 minutes after D3115 was dispatched and 
before dispatching D301, the dispatcher confirmed the field status of other stations along the 
line, confirmed again the station status of Wenzhou south station, learned other train operation 
status, and received and dispatched another 8 trains. 
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ITFs-5: Overconfidence about the physical system. 
ITFs-6: Believed the system was fail-safe. 
3. Organisational factors  
OGFs-1: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ actions for system safety; 
OGFs-2: SRB arranged long work time and heavy work load for operation staff; 
OGFs-3: SRB did not provide adequate operation rules; 
OGFs-4: SRB did not provide the proper training to operation staffs for emergency situations; 
 
It is worth noting that the factors in individual and team factors also could be the individual factors 
like those identified in the information processing coming from the [Entire] factors listed in section 
3.1.2. As a result, parts of the individual and team factors and all the individual errors identified will 
be listed as the causal factors for the UCA labelled as CF in the table 5. While the physical system and 
technology factors could trace back to the development process, the organisational factors listed above 
derive from organisational unsafe control actions identified in section 4.2.2. For example, OGFs-3 is 
the unsafe control action O1 (organisational influence factor in HFACS level 4) for SRB. 
 
4.2.4 Analyse organisational unsafe control actions (errors) 
In this part of the method, organisational unsafe control action will be analysed based on the 
organisational extented error taxonomy in section 3.1.2. In the five contextual factors, the last two 
classifications will be used to find the contributing factors for inadequate organisational factors. For 
OGFs-3(O1): SRB did not provide adequate operation rules, the analysis is following: 
Organisational unsafe control action: 
OGFs-1(O1): SRB did not provide adequate operation rules: 
Identify the contributing factors in organisational error taxonomy: 
OEFs-1: SRB did not have an adequate safety management for formulating adequate operation 
rules for its own operation system:  
OEFs-2: SRB did not allocate specific human resource to custom adequate operation rules for its 
own operation system:  
OEFs-3: Low degree of safety culture. 
The contributing factors in the contextual factors analysis: 
1. Physical system and technology factors 
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PTFs-1: The CTC system development company did not provide adequate operation rules for 
the emergency condition: requiring for more information about the development company (did 
not exist in the accident official report). 
2. Regulatory factors 
RGFs-1: MOR did not supervise the safety management of SRB; 
RGFs-2: MOR did not do to improve the degree of support to the safety culture in SRB. 
Similar to the situation in section 4.2.3, the organisational error (e.g. OEFs-1, OEFs-2) will be listed 
as the causal factors for SRB unsafe control action labelled as CF. While the physical system and 
technology factors could trace back to the development process. Regulatory factors are also the unsafe 
control action of MOR which will be analysed in MOR analysis. 
 
4.2.5 Recommendations 
One goal of the accident analysis is to determine how to change or re-engineer the safety-control 
structure in the most cost-effective and practical way in order to prevent similar accident processes in 
the future. Once the STAMP analysis has been completed, generating recommendations is relatively 
simple and follows on directly from the analysis results (Leveson, 2012, p. 384). Going through each 
of the causal factors and contextual factors and identifying those which could potentially be changed, 
controlled or compensated to prevent a similar accident will happen in the future, accident 
countermeasures can be generated. According to the analysis, there are influential ways from 
organisation to individual human controller, from operation process to development process, so 
systematic countermeasures can be generated. Based on the analysis results of sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, 
the recommendations can be developed from each causal factor with 76 countermeasures for human 
and organisational errors in the fifth column of Table 5. One causal factor can be mitigated by one or 
several safety constraint(s), and then the repeated safety constraints merged to provide a list for one 
component. 
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
The summary of the contributing factors for Yong-wen railway accident identified by HS-RAs is 
shown in Table 6. In HS-RAs method, the precondition for unsafe acts is used as the context for unsafe 
acts to occur.  There are three levels in the accident contributing factors list.  
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Table 6 about here 
 
In the first part of the process, HFACS classification was instrumental in preliminary factor 
identification. STAMP facilitated identification of the causal factors in the system development phase 
as well as the operational phase. Seventeen unsafe acts by the Dispatcher, the Station Operator, D3115 
driver, maintenance workers and design staff were identified alongside 12 contributing factors 
covering unsafe supervision; most of these appeared in system development phase and 14 
organisational factors. In the second part of the process, the STAMP analysis identified 112 causal 
factors including 64 causal factors from individual human errors, 23 causal factors related to unsafe 
supervision and 25 causal factors categorised as organisational errors. These factors not only include 
all the factors in the official report, but also identify the dangerous factor about the gap and overlap of 
human controller control authority, such as D3115 driver::CF2: D3115 driver was under control of 
the dispatcher and the station operator in the failure section. This dangerous condition is caused by 
PTFs-2: Inadequate operation rules about the emergency condition. Inadequate CTC operation rules 
give the control authority of D3115 driver to the dispatcher and the station operator resulting in the 
unsafe control for train D3115. Inadequate operation rules (MOR Science & Technology Bureau and 
Transport Bureau, 2007c) caused D3115 driver to assume that he was controlled by the dispatcher in 
the track section where the station operator was responsible for the supervision and control of the 
system.  
 
5.2 Comparison with other analysis cases using STAMP and/or HFACS  
There are three typical system accident analysis models based on HFACS – HFACS-RR (Reinach and 
Viale, 2006), HFACS-RAs (Zhan et al., 2017) and a System-Theoretic model and process with Human 
Factors (Lower et al. 2018). HFACS focuses on the causal factors in system operation phase. Thus, 
Reinach and Zhan just look the factors coming from HFACS four or five levels as the causal factors 
in the system operation phase for the accident. Those “causal factors” are only the symptoms not the 
causes. Therefore, countermeasures based on the outcomes of HFACS cannot be useful to prevent a 
future accident.  Zhan et al. (2017) promoted HFACS-RAs and used it to analyse Yong-wen railway 
accident. The summary of the causal factors identified is in Table 7.   
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Table 7 about here 
 
There are 4 outcomes for unsafe acts, 6 outcomes for unsafe supervision and 7 outcomes for 
organisational influences. This is less than HS-RAs (22 vs 46). The causal factors are all not related to 
the relevant system components, such as the description like “A2: Fail to contact with train D301 and 
inform the driver of the information of train D3115” is ambiguous because there is not an actor for the 
unsafe act. In contrast, the similar description about the unsafe acts “A3: Dispatcher did not track the 
D3115 run status in time, just informed the red-light strip information to the driver” and “A5: 
Dispatcher did not inform the red-light strip information to D301 driver” are more practice. 
Subsequently, HFACS-RA(s) gets the prevention measures based on the outcomes of HFACS four 
classifications directly. While HS-RAs takes the detailed analysis based on STAMP to find the root 
causes which hidden in system operation and management. Therefore, HS-RAs can find out more 
causal factors in detail. This is demonstrated in the case study in section 4 (see in Table 5). 
 
Harris and Li (2011) and Lower et al (2018) combined HFACS and STAMP to identify and analyse 
human and organisational error respectively. Harris and Li (2008) took the control engineering and 
safety constraint of STAMP into HFACS to link the factors in different level to show the influence 
chain from organisation to human individual controller. While Lower et al (2018) integrated HFACS 
categories into STAMP analysis to explain how organisational influences and supervision influence 
the Process Model Flaws and Decision making Context resulting in unsafe control actions. HS-RAs 
by contrast, combined human information processing to analyse unsafe control actions and we would 
argue adds an extra dimension which complements an analysis of unsafe control actions covering 
organisational factors, design flaws and operation and technical specification flaws.  
 
6. Conclusions, study limitations and future work 
In this paper, we have attempted to integrate STAMP and HFACS in order to construct a hybrid method 
which is suitable for human and organisational errors analysis for complex social-technical system 
accident with human cognitive process. This involved combining components and elements from 
STAMP and HFACS in a way that the methods might be integrated and introducing a human 
information processing element to the analysis. We then applied this to the Yong-Wen accident and 
compared the analysis results of HS-RAs with other analyses (e.g. HFACS-RAs analysis for Yong-
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wen railway accident, Zhan et al., 2017; STAMP analysis for Yong-wen railway accident, Dong, 2012). 
In this work, preliminary results offer evidence that the HS-RAs approach can contribute to railway 
safety by giving a detailed analysis of human and organisational errors in railway accidents. We 
acknowledge that there is room for improvement on hybrid accident analysis methods. First, further 
studies need to be carried out in order to improve the effectiveness of the countermeasures of the HS-
RAs analysis. Various countermeasures at different system levels were identified from the analysis, 
but a clearer understanding of the relationships among them is needed to ensure the overall system 
safety (i.e., what Leveson (2012, p.311) calls ‘intent specification’). For example, SRB and CRSC 
could establish their own safety management system based on the safety management regulation of 
MOR.   Secondly, a more detailed analysis of human errors needs to be carried out based on the mental 
model (Leveson, 2012, p.273; Johnson-Laird, 1995) in order to probe deeper into possible patterns. 
The human controller’s mental model consists of not only the models of automation and the controlled 
process (Leveson, 2012, p.281), but is also influenced by other factors including physiological state 
and human information processing capacity. Finally, the proposed methodology needs to be applied 
and evaluated with other case study examples, both within the context of railway systems and other 
domains of application.  
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Figures: 
Figure 1: The conceptual framework for the proposed hybrid method 
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Figure 2: the human information processing and analysis model (Adapted from Wickens and Flach (1988)) 
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Figure 3: The flow diagram of HS-RAs method. 
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Figure 4: Safety control structure of Yong-wen high-speed railway accident (This is an adaptation of the generic 
loop provided by Leveson 2012 in page 82 (fig 4.4) and page 66 (fig 3.2)) 
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Figure 5: The physical operating safety control structure of “7•23” accident 
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Tables: 
Table 1 Brief description for STAMP-HFACS categories (Modified from Table 1 in Zhan et al. 
(2017), p239) 
Main 
categories Sub-categories Description 
Organisational 
Influences 
Resources 
management 
Human 
Resources 
Deficiencies of selection and training of railway 
employees for system development or operation 
Financial 
Resources 
Poor financial situation or adverse allocation of 
funds such as cost-cutting in system 
development and operation, operating loss and 
lack of funding  
Equipment 
Resources 
Purchasing of unsuitable and unqualified 
equipment such as train control equipment or 
giving out the inadequate requirements for 
equipment development 
Organisational 
process 
Operational 
Standards 
Lack of appropriate Technical standards for 
operation and maintenance of trains and tracks  
System 
Policies 
The rules and regulations for promotion and 
punishments, or keeping organisational justice in 
system development or operation process 
System 
Procedures 
Policies, documentations, instructions and 
emergency plans for the railway system in 
system development or operation process 
Safety climate Safety 
Culture 
The safety climate, the faith of safety and 
recognition of safety in railway system in system 
development or operation process  
Safety 
Program 
The rules for safety training, training result 
tracking, safety oversight, etc. in system 
development or operation process  
Unsafe 
Supervisions 
Supervision 
disorder 
Inadequate 
Supervision 
Negligence of duty, fail to provide equipment 
maintenance, fail to provide skill and safety 
training and training track the qualifications of 
equipment in system development or operation 
process 
Planned 
Inappropriate 
Operations 
Inappropriate plan to the actual conditions, such 
as substandard maintenance plan and dispatching 
plan, etc. Fail to provide correct information and 
data, maintenance and construction mission not 
in accordance with regulations, in system 
development or operation process 
Failed to 
Correct 
Problems 
Failed to identify existing equipment failure and 
error operation, fail to initiate corrective action 
in system development or operation process 
 Supervision 
Violations 
Regulators authorized unqualified staff for duty, 
authorized mission not in accordance with 
regulations, fail to enforce rules and regulations 
in system development or operation process 
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Preconditions 
for Unsafe 
Acts 
Substandard 
Conditions 
of Operators 
Adverse 
Physiological 
States 
Pathological conditions such as medical illness, 
physical trauma, physical fatigue for individual 
in system development or operation process 
Adverse 
Mental 
States 
Attention-deficit, mental fatigue, self-satisfied, 
haste, misplaced motivation, etc. in system 
development or operation process 
Personal 
Readiness 
Violation of staff rest requirement and alcohol 
inspection, excessive physical training before 
work, lack of experience, poor training results, 
etc. in system development or operation process 
Substandard Condition of 
Team 
Inappropriate assignment of team members, an 
insufficient number of team members, lack of 
team leader and poor teamwork in system 
development or operation process 
Adverse conditions of 
Mission 
Time limitation, task difficulties in system 
development or operation process 
Adverse Physical 
Environment 
Foggy and rainy weather, debris flow, landslide, 
etc. 
Unsafe Acts Errors Decision 
Errors 
Misdiagnosed emergency and wrong response to 
an emergency, a wrong plan due to exceeding 
ability, improper procedure, poor decision, etc. 
in system development or operation process 
Skill-based 
Errors  
Omitted step in the procedure, poor technique in 
system development or operation process  
Wrong operations in operation process 
Violations Operation and maintenance not in compliance 
with standards, not qualified for the mission, fail 
to properly for work, speeding, etc. in system 
development or operation process 
 
 
Table 2 Contextual factors categories for accident and incident analysis (France (2018)) 
CATEs Factors 
1.Physical system and 
technology factors (PTFs) 
1.1 Operating environment design(including system operation 
rules) 
1.2 Interface design (e.g. displays and alerts)  
1.3 Maintenance/operational status of physical systems 
1.4 Availability or non-availability of job aids 
1.5 Other physical factors (e.g. weather)  
2. Individual and team 
factors(ITFs) 
2.1 Communication and teamwork; coordination 
2.2 Distractions/competing demands for attention 
2.3 Experience level; qualification and training 
2.4 Fatigue; work schedule 
2.5 Medical fitness for duty  
2.6 Expectations; similar situations encountered  
3.Organisational factors(OGFs) 3.1 Supervisory priorities/safety culture  
3.2 Resource constraints & production pressures 
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3.3 Policies and procedures (work schedules, training, 
discipline, etc.)  
3.4 Degree of feedback from employees 
4.Regulatory factors(RGFs) 4.1 Degree of support to/control over organisations 
4.2 Feedback (data) collected from organisations 
4.3 Regulations regarding employees 
4.4 Regulations regarding physical systems and Technologies 
5. External/Environmental 
factors; “Other” (EEFs) 
5.1 High-level societal, governmental, etc. influences  
5.2 Economic context, funding sources 
5.3 Demands for service driving production pressures 
5.4 Political climate’s effects on funding, regulation, etc. 
 
Table 3: System and system hazards in the Yong-Wen accident 
Development Operation  
System 
hazard 
 
System phases 
System components 
in Chinese railway 
system 
System 
components in 
Chinese railway 
system 
 
System phases 
Governments 
regulation 
agencies 
Chinese Ministry of 
Railways 
Chinese Ministry of 
Railways 
Governments 
regulation 
agencies 
Train 
control 
system 
failed to 
protect the 
safe 
distance 
between 
two trains. 
Maintenance and 
Evolution 
Shanghai Railway 
Bureau 
Shanghai Railway 
Bureau 
Safety 
Assurance and 
Supervision 
Project 
Management 
China Railway 
Signal & 
Communication 
Corporation (CRSC) 
Electrical & Signal 
Office 
Maintenance 
Design Beijing National 
Railway Research & 
Design Institute of 
Signal & Comm Co. 
LTD 
Transportation 
Office 
Operation 
Manufacture Shanghai Railway 
Communication 
Company (SRCC) 
Wenzhou Station Operation & 
Maintenance 
Physical system Train control system Train control system Physical system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Component with human or organisational factors 
33 
 
Component 
Organisational 
factors 
MOR [D,O] 
CRSC [D] 
CRSCD [D] 
TCC Project Team (TPT) [D] 
SRCC [D] 
Shanghai Railway Bureau(SRB) 
[D,O] 
Human factors 
Dispatcher [O] 
Station operator [O] 
D3115 Train driver [O] 
D301 Train driver [O] 
Maintenance worker [O] 
 
Table 5 Yong-wen accident causation analysis results based on HS-RAs framework 
HS-RAs main 
categories Component 
Unsafe control 
actions Individual causal factors Contextual factors Countermeasures 
Unsafe acts Dispatcher 
A1:Dispatcher did not 
check and confirm the 
track condition in time 
 
CF1: Dispatcher had  inadequate 
understanding of Emergency 
status 
CF2: Inadequate understanding 
of how his controlled process 
was influenced by feedbacks 
from Station, Trains and 
Maintenance 
CF3: The method for updating 
track situation was inadequate 
without complying with 
procedure or timeline or 
chronology 
CF4: Expected train feedback 
was missing 
CF5: Lack of experience about 
the failure condition; 
CF6: Too busy and Fatigue 
 
PTFs-1: Inadequate operation rules for the 
emergency condition [related to operation 
rule creation process]; 
ITFs-1: Inadequate communication with 
maintenance and station operator; 
ITFs-2: Maintenance workers did not 
feedback to stop using the failure track 
circuit [Maintenance::A2]; 
OGFs-1: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system safety [SRB::S1]; 
OGFs-2: SRB arranged the long work time 
and heavy work load for operation staff 
[SRB::O1]; 
OGFs-3: SRB did not provide adequate 
operation rules [SRB::O2]; 
OGFs-4: SRB did not provide the proper 
training to operation staffs for emergency 
situations [SRB::O3]; 
SC1:Dispatcher should improve 
his understanding of system 
emergency situation [P:[SRB:O-
SC1][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC2: Dispatcher should improve 
his ability about the system 
functions [P:[SRB:O-
SC1][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC3: Dispatcher should check 
track situation complying with 
operation procedure in timeline 
or chronology[P:[SRB:O-
SC1][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC4: Dispatcher should know 
how to solve the emergency 
situation without expected 
feedback [P:[SRB:O-
SC1][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC5:  Dispatcher should realise 
the failure of the communication 
channels and know how to deal 
with it [P:[TPT::O-SC5] 
[SRB::O-SC6]] 
SC6: Dispatcher should put the 
system safety in highest 
priority[P:[SRB:U-
SC5][SRB::O-SC5]]  
SC7: Dispatcher should know 
that the control target in the 
emergency situation is safety 
[P:[SRB:O-SC3]] 
SC8: Dispatcher should know 
the specific operation 
procedures in the emergency 
situation [P: [SRB::O-SC6]] 
A2:Dispatcher did not 
check the maintenance 
status about the failure 
equipment 
 
CF1: Dispatcher put the system 
safety in a lower priority than 
efficient 
CF2: Dispatcher thought 
maintenance workers would 
feedback the maintenance status 
CF3: Dispatcher thought there 
was no feedback from 
maintenance workers meant that 
the track situation was still 
failed and compliance with fail-
safe concept 
CF4: Lack of experience about 
the failure condition; 
CF5: Too busy and Fatigue 
 
PTFs-1: TCC and track circuits’ failures 
updated the track circuits’ signals breaking 
the train tracing condition for safety 
[related to physical development]; 
PFTs-2: Physical system did not provide 
proper failure alarm and information 
[related to physical system development]; 
PTFs-3: Inadequate operation rules for the 
emergency condition [related to operation 
rule creation process]; 
ITFs-1: Inadequate communication with 
maintenance; 
ITFs-2: Maintenance workers did not 
feedback to stop using the failure track 
circuit [Maintenance::A2]; 
OGFs-1: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system safety [SRB::S1]; 
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OGFs-2: SRB arranged the long work time 
and heavy work load for operation staff 
[SRB::O1]; 
OGFs-3: SRB did not provide adequate 
operation rules [SRB::O2]; 
OGFs-4: SRB did not provide the proper 
training to operation staffs for emergency 
situations [SRB::O3]; 
SC9:Dispatcher should know 
the system functions and  the 
specific operation procedures in 
the emergency situation 
[P:[ TPT::O-SC5][SRB::O-
SC6]] 
SC10: Dispatcher should 
connect with maintenance 
workers periodically to confirm 
the equipment status 
[P:[SRB:O-SC6]] 
SC11: Dispatcher should know 
this responsibilities in the 
emergency situation [P: 
[SRB::O-SC3]] 
SC12: Dispatcher should not 
assume the status of D3115 and 
confirm it with Wenzhou south 
station without clear 
information about the system 
status [P:[SRB:O-SC1][TPT::O-
SC5]] 
SC13: Dispatcher  should know 
the system functions in 
emergency situation [P:[SRB:O-
SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC14: Dispatcher should know 
how to solve the emergency 
situation without expected 
feedback [P:[SRB:O-
SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC15: Dispatcher should know 
the risk of his operation  
[P:[SRB:O-SC2][TPT::O-SC5]]  
SC16: Dispatcher should 
improve his understanding of 
system functions in emergency 
situations  [P:[SRB:O-
SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
 
A3:Dispatcher did not 
track the D3115 status 
in time, just informed 
the red-light strip 
information to the 
driver 
 
CF1: Dispatcher just assumed 
that D3115 could pass the fail 
section under OS mode and had 
reached Wenzhou south station 
CF2: Lack of experience about 
the failure condition; 
CF3: Too busy and Fatigue 
PTFs-1: TCC and track circuits’ failures 
updated the track circuits’ signals breaking 
the train tracing condition for safety 
[related to physical development]; 
PFTs-2: Physical system did not provide 
proper failure alarm and information 
[related to physical system development]; 
PTFs-3: Inadequate operation rules for the 
emergency condition [related to operation 
rule creation process]; 
ITFs-1: Inadequate communication 
between the station operator and the train 
D3115 driver; 
OGFs-1: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system safety [SRB::S1]; 
OGFs-2: SRB arranged the long work time 
and heavy work load for operation staff 
[SRB::O1]; 
OGFs-3: SRB did not provide adequate 
operation rules [SRB::O2]; 
OGFs-4: SRB did not provide the proper 
training to operation staffs for emergency 
situations [SRB::O3]; 
A4:Dispatcher 
dispatched D301 into 
the interval without 
informing the red-light 
strip information 
 
CF1: Dispatcher’s control of 
train D301  did not match the 
scope of his control area 
CF2: Dispatcher ‘s mental 
model of the track circuits was 
inconsistent with the real 
situation 
CF3: Dispatcher believed the 
system was itself fail-safe 
PTFs-1: TCC and track circuits’ failures 
updated the track circuits’ signals breaking 
the train tracing condition for safety 
[related to physical development]; 
PFTs-2: Physical system did not provide 
proper failure alarm and information 
[related to physical system development]; 
PTFs-3: Inadequate operation rules for the 
emergency condition [related to operation 
rule creation process]; 
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CF4: Dispatcher was 
overconfident about the 
technical system 
CF5: Lack of experience about 
the failure condition; 
CF6: Too busy and Fatigue 
 
ITFs-1: Inadequate communication 
between the station operator and the train 
D3115 driver; 
ITFs-2: Maintenance workers did not 
feedback to stop using the failure track 
circuit [Maintenance::A2]; 
OGFs-1: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system safety [SRB::S1]; 
OGFs-2: SRB arranged the long work time 
and heavy work load for operation staff 
[SRB::O1]; 
OGFs-3: SRB did not provide adequate 
operation rules [SRB::O2]; 
OGFs-4: SRB did not provide the proper 
training to operation staffs for emergency 
situations [SRB::O3]; 
A5: Dispatcher did not 
inform the red-light 
strip information to 
D301 driver after 
dispatching it into the 
interval 
 
CF1: Dispatcher thought it was 
not necessary to inform the red-
light strip to D301 driver 
CF2: Dispatcher had an 
inadequate understanding of the 
system operation was influenced 
by D301 status 
CF3: Dispatcher did not get 
enough emergency rule to deal 
with the emergency situation 
CF3: Dispatcher believed the 
system was itself fail-safe 
CF4: Dispatcher was 
overconfident about the 
technical system 
CF5: Lack of experience about 
the failure condition; 
CF6: Too busy and Fatigue 
PTFs-1: Inadequate operation rules for the 
emergency condition [related to operation 
rule creation process]; 
ITFs-1: Inadequate communication 
between the station operator and the train 
D3115 driver; 
ITFs-2: Maintenance workers did not 
feedback to stop using the failure track 
circuit [Maintenance::A2]; 
OGFs-1: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system safety [SRB::S1]; 
OGFs-2: SRB arranged the long work time 
and heavy work load for operation staff 
[SRB::O1]; 
OGFs-3: SRB did not provide adequate 
operation rules [SRB::O2]; 
OGFs-4: SRB did not provide the proper 
training to operation staffs for emergency 
situations [SRB::O3]; 
 A6: Dispatcher did not 
inform the station 
operator to hand over 
the train D301 after 
dispatching it 
CF1: Dispatcher’s control of 
train D301  did not match the 
scope of his control area 
CF2: Dispatcher believed the 
system was itself fail-safe 
PTFs-1: Inadequate operation rules for the 
emergency condition [related to operation 
rule creation process]; 
ITFs-1: Inadequate communication 
between the station operator; 
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CF3: Lack of experience about 
the failure condition; 
CF4: Too busy and Fatigue 
 
OGFs-1: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system safety [SRB::S1]; 
OGFs-2: SRB arranged the long work time 
and heavy work load for operation staff 
[SRB::O1]; 
OGFs-3: SRB did not provide adequate 
operation rules [SRB::O2]; 
OGFs-4: SRB did not provide the proper 
training to operation staffs for emergency 
situations [SRB::O3]; 
Station 
operator 
A1:The station operator 
did not perform the 
junction control with 
D301 and did not 
inform D301 about the 
status of D3115 in time 
CF1: The station operator’s 
control of train D301  did not 
match the scope of his control 
area 
CF2: The station operator just 
waited for the D3115 driver 
calling in; 
CF3: The station operator‘s 
mental model of the track 
circuits was inconsistent with 
the real situation; 
CF4: Lack of experience about 
the failure condition; 
CF5: The station operator 
believed the system was itself 
fail-safe 
CF6: Weak perception about 
danger 
PTFs-1: Inadequate operation rules about 
the junction control; 
ITFs-1: Inadequate communication with the 
train D3115 driver; 
OGFs-1: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system safety [SRB::S1]; 
OGFs-2: SRB arranged the long work time 
and heavy work load for operation staff 
[SRB::O1]; 
OGFs-3: SRB did not provide adequate 
operation rules [SRB::O2]; 
OGFs-4: SRB did not provide the proper 
training to operation staffs for emergency 
situations [SRB::O3]; 
 
SC1: The station operator 
should know operation 
procedures in emergency 
situation [P:[SRB:O-
SC1][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC2: The station operator 
should realise the failure of the 
communication channels and 
know how to deal with it  
[P:[SRB:O-SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC3: The station operator 
should connect with 
maintenance workers 
periodically to confirm the 
equipment status  [P:[SRB:O-
SC6]] 
SC4: The station operator 
should connect with Dispatcher 
workers periodically to 
feedback the equipment status in 
station [P:[SRB:O-
SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC5: The station operator 
should know his responsibilities 
in the emergency situation 
[P:[SRB:O-SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
 
A2:The station operator 
did not report the 
equipment maintenance 
status to dispatcher in 
time 
CF1: The station operator’s 
control of the maintenance work 
was not exclusive 
CF2: The station operator 
though he did not need to check 
the equipment maintenance 
status forwardly and 
maintenance workers could 
report to Dispatcher directly 
 
PTFs-1: Inadequate operation rules about 
the emergency condition; 
ITFs-1: Inadequate communication with the 
dispatcher and maintenance workers; 
OGFs-1: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system safety [SRB::S1]; 
OGFs-2: SRB did not provide adequate 
operation rules [SRB::O2]; 
OGFs-3: SRB did not provide the proper 
training to operation staffs for emergency 
situations [SRB::O3]; 
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A3:The station operator 
knew that D3115 failed 
to turn to OS mode for 
three times and did not 
report this to dispatcher 
CF1: The station operator had 
inadequate understanding of his 
control authority in the 
emergency situation 
CF2: The station operator just 
waited for the dispatcher asking  
CF3: Weak perception about 
danger 
PTFs-1: Inadequate operation rules about 
the emergency condition; 
ITFs-1: Inadequate communication with the 
dispatcher and maintenance workers; 
OGFs-1: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system safety [SRB::S1]; 
OGFs-2: SRB did not provide adequate 
operation rules [SRB::O2]; 
OGFs-3: SRB did not provide the proper 
training to operation staffs for emergency 
situations [SRB::O3]; 
A4: The station 
operator did not 
command D3115 driver 
to drive out of the 
failure track section 
CF1: The station operator had 
inadequate understanding of his 
control authority in the 
emergency situation 
CF2: The station operator 
believed the system was itself 
fail-safe  
CF3: Weak perception about 
danger 
PTFs-1: Inadequate operation rules about 
the emergency condition; 
PTFs-2: Operation rules regulated that 
everyone should comply with dispatcher’s 
command at any situation 
ITFs-1: Inadequate communication with the 
dispatcher and D3115 driver; 
OGFs-1: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system safety [SRB::S1]; 
OGFs-2: SRB did not provide adequate 
operation rules [SRB::O2]; 
OGFs-3: SRB did not provide the proper 
training to operation staffs for emergency 
situations [SRB::O3]; 
 
D3115 driver 
A1:D3115 driver 
insisted to select OS 
mode to restart the train 
to run out of the failed 
section, just waiting for 
the right kinds of code 
for the on-board 
equipment to OS mode 
for 7 minutes and 40 
seconds 
CF1: D3115 driver put the 
dispatcher’s command 
following at a higher priority 
than safety 
CF2: D3115 driver did not know 
that the command did not match 
the scope of the process under 
control in the emergency 
situation 
CF3: D3115 driver did not think 
about the influence to other 
trains of the long-time stay 
CF4: D3115 did not get any 
guide for this kind of emergency 
situation before 
PTFs-1: Operation rules regulated that 
everyone should comply with dispatcher’s 
command at any situation 
PTFs-2: Inadequate operation rules about 
the emergency condition; 
ITFs-1: Inadequate communication with the 
dispatcher [Dispatcher::A3]and the station 
operator; 
OGFs-1: Nanchang railway bureau 
[requiring information of Nanchang railway 
bureau]; 
 
SC1: D3115 driver should put 
the system safety in highest 
priority [P:[SRB:O-
SC5][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC2: D3115 driver should 
improve his understanding of 
system functions [P:[SRB:O-
SC1][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC3: D3115 driver should know 
the risk of the long-time 
stopping[P:[SRB:O-
SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC4: D3115 should be given 
some guide for the emergency 
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CF5: D3115 failed to connect 
with Dispatcher and the station 
operator to get new command 
CF6: Weak perception about 
danger 
situation [P:[SRB:O-
SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC5: D3115 should realise the 
failure of communication 
channel and know how to deal 
with it [P:[SRB:O-
SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC6: D3115 driver should 
improve his understanding of 
system functions and be give a 
clear sign about the fail section 
[P:[SRB:O-SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC7: D3115 driver should know 
check the failure status 
periodically and find the new 
things about the failure 
[P:[SRB:O-SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC8: D3115 driver should be 
alert in advance for the failure 
situation [P:[SRB:O-
SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC9: D3115 driver should 
realise the abnormal status about 
the track circuits and take 
actions to deal with it 
[P:[SRB:O-SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
A2: D3115 driver failed 
to report the condition 
to dispatcher and station 
operator 
CF1: Communication 
interruption blocked the 
communication with dispatcher 
and the station operator 
PTFs-1: Communication interruption 
 
A3: D3115 insisted to 
report the situation to 
dispatcher 
CF1: D3115 driver thought 
dispatcher could control him 
directly in the emergency 
situation 
CF2: D3115 driver was under 
control of the dispatcher and the 
station operator 
CF3: D3115 thought dispatcher 
had the higher control authority 
for him in the emergency 
situation 
PTFs-1: Operation rules regulated that 
everyone should comply with dispatcher’s 
command at any situation 
PTFs-2: Inadequate operation rules about 
the emergency condition; 
ITFs-1: Inadequate communication with the 
dispatcher and the station operator; 
OGFs-1: Nanchang railway bureau 
[requiring information of Nanchang railway 
bureau]; 
 
A4: D3115 driver did 
not supervise the 
operation of train 
D3115 to find the 
abnormal situation 
CF1: D3115 driver just thought 
there was a normal failure on 
the track and the signal could 
turn red normally 
CF2: D3115 driver thought that 
he just needed to do something 
after the train braked down 
CF3: D3115 driver did not know 
using the stop point to confirm 
the failure condition  
PTFs-1: Operation rules did not provide the 
requirements for the driver’s supervision   
PTFs-2: Inadequate operation rules about 
the emergency condition; 
ITFs-1: Inadequate communication with the 
dispatcher [Dispatcher::A3] and the station 
operator; 
OGFs-1: Nanchang railway bureau 
[requiring information of Nanchang railway 
bureau]; 
 
Maintenance 
worker 
A1:Maintenance 
workers did not follow 
the repair procedure to 
stop using the failed 
equipment 
CF1: Maintenance workers put 
safety in a lower priority 
CF2: Maintenance workers did 
not know the regulated repair 
procedure 
PTFs-1: there was not the operation rules 
existing for maintenance workers by hand 
ITFs-1: Inadequate coordination among 
maintenance workers; 
OGFs-1: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system safety [SRB::S1]; 
OGFs-2: SRB did not provide the proper 
training to operation staffs for emergency 
situations [SRB::O3]; 
SC1: Maintenance workers 
should put system safety in 
highest position [P:[SRB:O-
SC5]] 
SC2: Maintenance workers 
should know their 
responsibilities in emergency 
situation with emergency rules 
[P:[SRB:O-SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
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A2:Maintenance 
workers did not report 
the failure conditions to 
the dispatcher or the 
station operator 
CF1: Maintenance workers 
thought they should feedback 
the information to the dispatcher 
or the station operator after they 
solved the problem or the 
dispatcher or the station 
operator asked the failure 
information  
CF2: Maintenance workers did 
not know the regulated repair 
procedure 
CF3: Weak perception about 
danger 
PTFs-1: there was not the operation rules 
existing for maintenance workers by hand 
ITFs-1: Inadequate coordination among 
maintenance workers; 
OGFs-1: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system safety [SRB::S1]; 
OGFs-2: SRB did not provide the proper 
training to operation staffs for emergency 
situations [SRB::O3]; 
SC3: Maintenance workers 
should know the risk of their 
actions [P:[SRB:O-
SC3][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC4: Maintenance workers 
should connect with Dispatcher 
or the station operator 
periodically to confirm the 
equipment status [P:[SRB:O-
SC6][TPT::O-SC5]] 
SC5: Maintenance workers 
should know the system 
functions [P:[SRB:O-
SC2][TPT::O-SC5]] A4:Maintenance 
workers did not find the 
reason for the failure, 
and even not notice the 
PIO board failure alarm 
information from the 
signalling monitor 
system 
CF1: Maintenance workers did 
not know how to do in the 
emergency situation 
CF2: Maintenance workers did 
not know the exact mean about 
the equipment alarm 
PTFs-1: there was not the operation rules 
existing for maintenance workers by hand 
ITFs-1: Inadequate coordination among 
maintenance workers; 
OGFs-1: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system safety [SRB::S1]; 
OGFs-2: SRB did not provide the proper 
training to operation staffs for emergency 
situations [SRB::O3]; 
Unsafe 
supervision 
MOR S1:MOR did not inspect 
the safe operation and 
the safety rules 
execution of Shanghai 
Railway Bureau [O] 
CF1: MOR did not clearly know 
its responsibilities for system 
safety 
CF2: MOR implemented an 
inadequate safety management 
RGFs-1: There was not the regulations for 
MOR safety supervision implement 
 
U-SC1: MOR should improve 
its understanding of system 
safety and  recognize its 
responsibilities for system 
safety clearly  
U-SC2: MOR should establish 
proper safety management  
U-SC3:MOR should take the 
future situations into 
consideration when establishing 
up system development goals 
U-SC4: MOR should  establish 
a proper management procedure 
for product technical reviews  
U-SC5: There should be an 
independent safety part to 
supervise MOR action 
S2: MOR had rushed to 
speed up the 
construction and system 
development, in order 
to catch up or be ahead 
of the schedule, and did 
not put enough 
considerations and 
actions on safety [D] 
CF1: MOR did not implement 
adequate safety management 
CF2: time pressure 
CF3: MOR put safety in a lower 
priority 
EEFs-1: There was not an independent 
safety part to supervise MOR action 
 
S3:The product 
technical reviews 
lacked of sound basis 
and foundation [D] 
CF1: MOR implemented an 
inadequate  safety management 
CF2: There were inadequate 
assignments of the product 
technical reviews 
PTFs-1: the materials supporting technical 
review was inadequate; 
ITFs-1: MOR needed to speed up 
[MOR::S2] 
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CF3: “fly-fix-fly” wrong safety 
concept 
SRB S1: SRB did not 
supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system 
safety [O]; 
CF1: SRB did not have an 
adequate safety management for 
formulating adequate operation 
rules for its own operation 
system:  
CF2: SRB did not allocate 
specific human resource to 
custom adequate operation rules 
for its own operation system:  
CF3: Low degree of safety 
culture. 
PTFs-1: The CTC system development 
company did not provide adequate 
operation rules for the emergency 
condition: requiring for more information 
about the development company (did not 
exist in the accident official report). 
RGFs-1: MOR did not supervise the safety 
management of SRB [MOR::S1]; 
RGFs-2: MOR did not do improve the 
degree of support to the safety culture in 
SRB [MOR::O2]. 
U-SC1: SRB should establish 
proper safety management for 
rules execution and inspection 
based on the MOR safety 
management 
U-SC2: SRB should assign a 
proper position to execute the 
inspection based on its safety 
management procedure  
U-SC3: SRB should establish a 
proper assignment of the goals 
of the equipment validation and 
verification based system safety 
analysis 
U-SC4: SRB should supervise 
the priority of system safety of 
its staff [P: [SRB::O-SC5]] 
S2:SRB was not strict 
enough in the execution 
of the emergency 
operation rules, was not 
effective in monitoring 
the regulation execution 
in operation [O] 
CF1: SRB did not have an 
adequate safety management for 
rules execution and inspection 
CF2: SRB did not know how to 
achieve the system safety goal 
in expectation 
CF3: SRB did not assign a 
proper position to execute the 
inspection 
RGFs-1: Inadequate emergency operation 
rules 
RGFs-2: MOR did not supervise the safety 
management of SRB [MOR::S1]; 
RGFs-3: MOR did not do improve the 
degree of support to the safety culture in 
SRB [MOR::O2]; 
RGDs-4: The product technical reviews 
lacked of sound basis and foundation 
[MOR::S3]. 
S3:SRB did not follow 
the safety management 
standards to stop the 
equipment using in the 
new line without a 
comprehensive 
validation and 
verification [D] 
CF1: SRB established the 
inadequate assignment of the 
goals of the equipment 
validation and verification 
CF2: SRB did not assign 
specific  position to execute the 
equipment validation and 
verification 
CF3: “fly-fix-fly” wrong safety 
concept 
PTFs-2: Underdeveloped system 
[TPT::O2&S1] 
RGFs-1: Inadequate safety management 
regulation 
RGFs-2: MOR did not supervise the safety 
management of SRB [MOR::S1]; 
RGFs-3: MOR did not do improve the 
degree of support to the safety culture in 
SRB [MOR::O2]. 
CRSC S1:CRSC did not 
inspect the safety and 
quality management of 
CRSCD, and did not 
review the process for 
design and development 
activities [D] 
CF1: CRSC did not assign a 
specific position to implement 
the inspection and review 
CF2: CRSC did not assign the 
clear goals and responsibilities 
of inspection and review 
PTFs-1: System development based on an 
underdeveloped system [TPT::O2&S1] 
PTFs-1: The design flaws [TPT::S1&S2] 
RGFs-1: MOR did not supervise the safety 
management of CRSC [MOR::S1]; 
RGFs-2: MOR did not do improve the 
degree of support to the safety culture in 
CRSC [MOR::O2]. 
U-SC1: CRSC should assign a 
proper position to execute the 
inspection based on its safety 
management procedure  
U-SC2: CRSC should establish 
a proper assignment of the goals 
and responsibilities of 
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S2:CRSC did not 
perform comprehensive 
validation and 
verification for the TCC 
system to ensure the 
product meets national 
safety and quality 
requirements [D] 
CF3: CRSC did not have 
adequate safety management for 
the safety of its products 
CF4: CRSC did not assign the 
clear goals and responsibilities 
for product validation and 
verification 
RGFs-1: MOR did not supervise the safety 
management of CRSC [MOR::S1]; 
RGDs-2: The product technical reviews 
lacked of sound basis and foundation 
[MOR::S3]. 
inspection and review  based 
system safety analysis 
U-SC3: CRSC should establish 
proper safety management for 
rules execution and inspection 
based on the MOR safety 
management 
U-SC4: CRSC should establish 
a proper assignment of the goals 
and responsibilities of product 
validation and verification based 
system safety analysis  
CRSCD S1:CRSCD made the 
decision to update TCC 
system based on the 
oral report from TPT, 
and did not effectively 
evaluate the quality and 
safety of the TCC been 
developing at that time 
[D] 
CF1: CRSCD did not have 
adequate safety management for 
its sub-departments and 
products design 
CF16: CRSCD did not have an 
adequate communication 
channel with its sub-
departments 
RGFs-1:CRSC did not inspect the safety 
and quality management of CRSCD, and 
did not review the process for design and 
development activities [CRSC::S1] 
U-SC1: CRSCD should 
establish proper safety 
management for its sub-
departments and products 
design based on the CRSC 
safety management 
U-SC2: CRSCD should 
establish an adequate 
communication channel with its 
sub-departments based on its 
safety management  
U-SC3: CRSCD should 
establish a proper goal of the 
review based system safety 
analysis  
U-SC4: CRSCD should 
establish proper goals and 
responsibilities of product 
validation and verification based 
system safety analysis  
U-SC5: CRSCD should assign a 
proper position to execute the 
validation and verification based 
on its safety management 
procedure  
S2:CRSCD did not 
inspect the safety and 
quality management of 
TPT, and did not review 
the process for design 
and development 
activities [D] 
CF1: CRSCD did not have 
proper safety management for 
its products 
CF18: CRSCD did not assign a 
clear goal of the review 
RGFs-1:CRSC did not inspect the safety 
and quality management of CRSCD, and 
did not review the process for design and 
development activities [CRSC::S1] 
S3:CRSCD did not 
perform comprehensive 
validation and 
verification for the TCC 
system [D] 
CF1: CRSCD did not assign 
clear goals and responsibilities 
of the validation and verification 
CF2: CRSCD did not allocate 
specific position to implement 
the validation and verification 
RGFs-1:CRSC did not perform 
comprehensive validation and verification 
for the TCC system to ensure the product 
meets national safety and quality 
requirements [CRSC::S2] 
TPT S1:TPT decided to 
research and develop 
LKD2-T1 TCC system 
based on an 
CF1: TPT did not have proper 
safety management (such as 
hazards analysis and track) for 
its products  
RGFs-1:CRSCD made the decision to 
update TCC system based on the oral report 
from TPT, and did not effectively evaluate 
U-SC1: TPT should establish 
proper safety management for 
its products design based on the 
CRSCD safety management  
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uncompleted product, 
and did not take a 
complete hazard 
analysis for new 
product [D] 
  the quality and safety of the TCC been 
developing at that time [CRSCD::S1] 
RGFs-2:CRSCD did not inspect the safety 
and quality management of TPT, and did 
not review the process for design and 
development activities [CRSCD::S2] 
Organisational 
influences 
MOR O1:MOR did not have a 
specialized department 
which is responsible for 
safety issues [O] 
CF1: MOR did not have 
adequate assignment of safety 
goal 
CF2: MOR had inadequately 
allocated the control and 
management of the safety issues 
into difference departments 
RGFs-1: There was not the regulations for 
MOR specific safety department 
EEFs-1: There was not an independent 
safety party to supervise MOR organisation 
 
O-SC1: MOR should assign the 
safety goal based on its safety 
management 
O-SC2: MOR should allocate 
the control and management of 
the safety issues into proper 
departments based on its safety 
management  
O-SC3:MOR should know its 
responsibilities for system 
safety 
O-SC4: MOR should establish 
an adequate safety culture of 
preventing similar accident 
happen again into its safety 
management  
O-SC5: MOR should establish 
an adequate communication 
channel to collect all the 
emergency or incident situations 
based on its safety management 
O-SC6:MOR should establish 
proper emergency and failure 
management rules based its 
safety management 
O-SC7: MOR should establish a 
proper management for system 
regulations and standards  
O-SC8: MOR should make a 
management to control the 
change among regulations and 
standards  
O2:MOR just took 
punishment way to 
enforce the Shanghai 
Railway Bureau and its 
system operators to 
follow the safety rules 
[O] 
CF1: MOR did not know how to 
implement the safety 
management in a scientific way 
CF2: MOR did not have an 
adequate safety culture 
RGFs-1: Inadequate safety climate & 
culture 
 
O3:Emergency and 
failure management 
rules were not complete 
[D] 
CF1: MOR did not have an 
adequate communication 
channel to collect all the 
emergency or incident situations 
CF2: MOR did not have proper 
procedures to established 
adequate emergency and failure 
management rules 
RGFs-1: Inadequate safety construction 
RGFs-2: Inadequate safety climate & 
culture 
 
O4:The regulations and 
standards for the 
dedicated passenger 
line systems were not 
complete [D] 
CF1: MOR did not have proper 
management of system 
regulations and standards 
CF2: All the regulations and 
standards changed respectively 
without thinking about others 
RGFs-1: Inadequate safety construction 
RGFs-2: Inadequate safety climate & 
culture 
 
O5:There were function 
overlaps between 
different departments 
inside of the 
organisation [D] 
CF1: MOR did not have 
adequate assignment of safety 
goals 
 
RGFs-1: Inadequate safety construction 
RGFs-2: Inadequate safety climate & 
culture 
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O6:The product 
technical reviews 
lacked sound basis and 
foundation [D] 
CF1: There were not proper 
management of the product 
technical reviews 
CF2: MOR did not make a clear 
goal and responsibility for the 
product technical reviews 
RGFs-1: Inadequate safety construction 
RGFs-2: Inadequate safety climate & 
culture 
 
O-SC9: MOR should establish a 
proper management of its 
product technical reviews based 
on  its safety management 
 
 
SRB O1: SRB did not 
provide adequate 
operation rules[O] 
CF1: SRB did not know the 
signalling functions in normal 
and abnormal situation 
CF2: There was not a proper 
communication channel 
between signalling monitoring 
system and operation system  
RGFs-1:The regulations and standards for 
the dedicated passenger line systems were 
not complete [MOR::04] 
O-SC1: SRB should establish 
proper safety management and 
training processes based on the 
safety management of MOR  
O-SC2:SRB should clear the 
contribution to system safety of 
the management and training 
processes 
O-SC3:SRB should take a good 
understanding of signaling 
monitoring functions  
O-SC4: The communication 
channel between signalling 
monitoring system and 
operation system should be 
established for the system safety 
based on system hazard analysis 
O-SC5: SRB should put the 
system safety in highest priority 
O-SC6:MOR should establish 
proper emergency and failure 
management rules based its 
safety management 
[P:[MOR::O-SC6]] 
 
O2: SRB arranged the 
long work time and 
heavy work load for 
operation staff [O] 
CF1: SRB did not know the 
adequate work time and work 
load for operation staff 
RGFs-1:The regulations and standards for 
the dedicated passenger line systems were 
not complete [MOR::04] 
RGFs-2: SRB just arranged the work based 
on experience; 
O3: SRB did not 
provide the proper 
training to operation 
staffs for emergency 
situations[O] 
CF1: Inadequate safety 
management 
CF2: Inadequate safety 
supervision on operation staff 
CF3: Lack knowledge of 
emergency situations 
RGFs-1:Emergency and failure 
management rules were not complete 
[MOR::O3] 
RGFs-2:The regulations and standards for 
the dedicated passenger line systems were 
not complete [MOR::O4] 
RGFs-3: SRB did not supervise its staffs’ 
actions for system safety to find existing 
problem [SRB::S1]; 
CRSC O1:CRSC did not 
establish a safety 
management program 
for the CRSCD [D] 
CF1: CRSC did not know the 
responsibilities of safety 
management 
CF2: CRSC did not know the 
goals of the safety management  
RGFs-1:CRSC did not inspect the safety 
and quality management of CRSCD, and 
did not review the process for design and 
development activities [CRSC::S1] 
RGFs-2:There were function overlaps 
between different departments inside of the 
organisation [MOR::O5] 
O-SC1:CRSC should clear the 
responsibilities of safety 
management based on the 
system functions and MOR 
safety management 
O-SC2: CRSC should establish 
a proper goal of the safety 
management based on system 
hazard analysis  
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CRSCD O1:CRSCD did not 
give out the safety 
requirements and safety 
design principles for 
TCC system 
development, just 
allowed the TPT 
referenced the 
experience of an 
uncompleted product 
[D] 
CF1: CRSCD did not have 
proper safety management for 
its products and sub-
departments 
CF2: CRSCD did not realize the 
goals of establishment of safety 
requirements and safety design 
principles for TCC system 
CF3: CRSCD just thought TPT 
could compliance the product 
safety requirements by itself 
RGFs-1:CRSC did not establish a safety 
management program for the CRSCD 
[CRSC::O1] 
RGFs-2:CRSC did not inspect the safety 
and quality management of CRSCD, and 
did not review the process for design and 
development activities [CRSC::S1] 
RGFs-3:The regulations and standards for 
the dedicated passenger line systems were 
not complete [MOR::O4] 
 
 
O-SC1:CRSCD should establish 
proper safety management for 
its products and sub-
departments based on the safety 
management of CRSC  
O-SC2: CRSCD should always 
clearly know the goals of  safety 
requirements and safety design 
principles for TCC system 
O-SC3: CRSCD should always 
take safety management to its 
sub-departments and  never 
assume the working status of 
them 
O-SC4: CRSCD should clear 
the contribution to system safety 
of the management  
 
O2:CRSCD did not 
establish a safety 
management program 
for the TPT [D] 
CF1: CRSCD did not realize the 
importance of the safety 
management program 
RGFs-1:CRSC did not establish a safety 
management program for the CRSCD 
[CRSC::O1] 
RGFs-2:CRSC did not inspect the safety 
and quality management of CRSCD, and 
did not review the process for design and 
development activities [CRSC::S1] 
TPT O1:TPT did not 
establish a fix research 
and development group 
for LKD2-T1 
development, just 
through oral report to 
report the design and 
development process to 
CRSCD [D] 
CF1: TPT had an inadequate 
safety management system for 
its products and did not think 
about the change of external 
factors 
CF2: There was an inadequate 
communication channel 
provided for the product 
development 
RGFs-1:CRSCD did not establish a safety 
management program for the TPT 
[CRSCD::O2] 
O-SC1: TPT should establish an 
adequate safety management 
system for its products based on 
the safety management of 
CRSCD and  take the external 
factors into consideration when 
implement safety manage 
O-SC2: An adequate 
communication channel 
provided for the product 
development should be 
established between different 
product design groups 
O-SC3: TPT should establish 
adequate safety management for 
its products based on the safety 
management of CRSCD  
O-SC4: TPT should establish 
adequate safety management for 
its products and learning 
processes based on the safety 
O2: TPT did not make a 
complete product 
design plan for LKD2-
T1 and a design 
materials track 
management rules. That 
led the design materials 
missing in the design 
process [D] 
CF1: TPT had not an inadequate 
safety management  
CF2: Design staff was lack of 
safety concept 
CF3: Design staff violated the 
safety regulation 
CF4: Design staff was lack of 
safety evluation 
  
RGFs-1:The regulations and standards for 
the dedicated passenger line systems were 
not complete [MOR::O4] 
RGFs-2:TPT did not establish a fix 
research and development group for LKD2-
T1 development, just through oral report to 
report the design and development process 
to CRSCD [TPT::O1] 
 
O3:TPT did not have a 
staff competent 
assessment plan and 
make a training plan to 
CF25: TPT did not have 
inadequate safety management 
and learning processes 
RGFs-1:CRSCD did not establish a safety 
management program for the TPT 
[CRSCD::O2] 
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improve staff 
competent [D]  
management of CRSCD and 
system hazard analysis 
O-SC5:TPT should provide 
documents for equipment 
functions and instructions for 
equipment users 
 
Note：1. The form A::B means that B is an action or factor of A, A stands for component, e.g. SRB; [A::B] is a symbol means that the factor relates to this item; 2. [D] is a symbol means that a component may 
influence the system safety condition in the system development phase; [O] is a symbol represents that a component may influence the system safety condition in system operation phase. While [D, O] indicates 
that the influence may happen in both phases; [P] is a symbol represents that this is the precondition for a safety countermeasure.
Table 6: The summary of the results of HS-RA(s) analysis (the details in Table 4-3) 
 
Preliminary factor 
Identification 
 Analysis Recommendation 
HS-RA(s) 
level 
System phase 
Total 
Causal 
factors 
Contextual 
factors 
Countermeasures 
Development Operation 
Unsafe acts 3 17 20 64 48 35 
Unsafe 
supervision 
9 3 12 23 18 19 
Organisational 
influences 
10 5 14 25 12 25 
Total 22 25 46 112 78 79 
 
 
Table 7: The summary of the results of HFACS-RA(s) analysis (from Zhan et al., 2017, p243) 
HS-
RA(s) level 
Causal 
factors 
Unsafe acts 4 
Preconditions for 
Unsafe Acts 
5 
Unsafe 
supervision 
6 
Organisational 
influences 
7 
Total 22 
 
